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Foreword
Between March and May 1995 the Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy
Research (CAEPR) sponsored a thematic seminar series titled 'Policy
Aspects of Native Title1. The following eight seminars were presented:
• 'Relative allocative efficiency of the Native Title Act 1993 and the
Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1976' by Siobahn McKenna (March).
• 'Resource development agreements on Aboriginal land in the 1990s:
features and trends' by Ciaran O'Faircheallaigh (March).
• 'Negotiations between Aboriginal communities and Mining
companies: structures and process' by Ciaran O'Faircheallaigh (April).
• Tourism enterprise and native title: the Tjapukai Dance Theatre,
Cairns' by Julie Finlayson (April).
• 'Funding native title claims: establishing equitable procedures' by Jon
Altman and Diane Smith (April).
• 'Native title and land management' by Elspeth Young and Helen Ross
(April).
• 'Native Title Act 1993: latest developments and implementation issues
for resource developers' by Jon Altman (May).
• 'Native title and regional agreements: the Kimberley case' by Patrick
Sullivan (May).
Five of these seminars have now been revised into CAEPR Discussion
Papers Nos 85-89. Of the others, Siobahn McKenna's seminar was
published earlier as CAEPR Discussion Paper No. 79 and Jon Altman and
Diane Smith's seminar was published as 'Funding Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander Representative Bodies under the Native Title Act 1993',
(Issues Paper No. 8, Land, Rights, Laws: Issues of Native Title, Native Title
Research Unit, Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Studies, Canberra).
Owing to the pressing public policy significance of the issues addressed in
this series, these discussion papers are intentionally exploratory and aim to
disseminate information to a wider audience than that able to attend the
seminars at the Australian National University.
Jon Altman
Series Editor
July 1995
ABSTRACT
Aborigines make up by far the largest proportion of the long-term residents
of the Kimberley region and much of the population living outside the
major towns. They already control, by one means or another, considerable
areas of land. The Native Title Act 1993 offers the possibility of greater
control still. They have a network of community-controlled functional
organisations such as medical services, radio stations, service delivery
resource agencies, cultural and language maintenance centres, and a
publishing house. Not surprisingly with Canadian models before them and
the example of the Torres Strait Regional Authority, the mood is growing
among these organisations, in the communities, and with the political
leadership, for greater regional autonomy and a form of Aboriginal
governance in the region. This paper analyses the various pressures for a
regional authority under the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Commission (ATSIC), a regional agreement or various sub-regional
agreements over multiple land use, and a form of regional Aboriginal
governance. It points out the distinction between these three approaches to
regional autonomy. It suggests that the need for the first is being driven by
pressures for multiple access to land, while the proposal for the second is
simply a means of more efficient delivery of Commonwealth development
funding and may in the long term act as an impediment to greater
autonomy. The third, regional governance, embraces the first two needs
and goes beyond them to respond to the longstanding need, sharpened
since the Mabo decision, for a new form of political accommodation
between Aborigines and settlers in the Kimberley.
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Aborigines make up by far the largest proportion of the long-term residents
of the Kimberley region and much of the population living outside the
major towns. They already control, by one means or another, considerable
areas of land. The Native Title Act 1993 (NTA) offers the possibility of
greater control still. They have a network of community-controlled
functional organisations such as medical services, radio stations, service
delivery resource agencies, cultural and language maintenance centres, and
a publishing house. Not surprisingly with Canadian models before them,
and the example of the Torres Strait Regional Authority (TSRA), the mood
is growing among these organisations, in the communities, and with the
political leadership, for greater regional autonomy and a form of
Aboriginal governance in the region.
This paper analyses the various pressures for a regional authority under the
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC), a regional
agreement or various sub-regional agreements over multiple land use, and
a form of regional Aboriginal governance. It points out the distinction
between these three approaches to regional autonomy. It suggests that the
need for a regional agreement is being driven by pressures for multiple
access to land, while the proposal for a regional authority on the TSRA
model is simply a means of more efficient delivery of Commonwealth
development funding and may in the long term act as an impediment to
greater autonomy. A regional agreement may include regional governance,
embracing the first two approaches and going beyond them to respond to
the longstanding need, sharpened since the Mabo decision, for a new form
of political accommodation between Aborigines and settlers in the
Kimberley.
The popular view of the region, promoted in tourist and media descriptions
and clearly informing government policy, is that the Kimberley is
dominated by the pastoral industry, with significant inputs from mining
and tourism and that most of the population, the majority white, live in the
towns servicing these industries (Crough and Christophersen 1993: 53, 63-
4). Aborigines, according to this stylised view, are a minority of welfare
recipients mainly living in towns or large communities and they need to be
brought into the mainstream economy. A number of studies of the region
sponsored by the Kimberley Land Council (KLC) in recent years now
challenge this view (Green and Hawke 1994; Crough and Christophersen
1993; KLC 1995). In an exhaustive study of the economic profile of the
region, Crough and Christophersen conclude: 'In the absence of any major
future non-Aboriginal population growth, the Aboriginal population can be
regarded as the long-term demographic base of the region' (Crough and
Christophersen 1993: 23).
Although the results of the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) Census
for 1991 show that of the Kimberley population of approximately 23,000
people 45 per cent are Aboriginal, there is reason to believe that the
Aboriginal population could be as much as 50 per cent higher than this
(Crough and Christophersen 1993: 22). Absolute numbers, however, are
not the major issue. More important is the information that Aborigines are
the stable population and exhibit a more normal demographic profile. Of
the respondents to the Census over five years of age 83 per cent had been
resident at the same address, or in the same area five years previously,
compared to 35 per cent of non-Aborigines. Non-Aborigines are
concentrated in the 20-44 year age group while 50 per cent of the
Aboriginal population is aged under 20 years (KLC 1995: 20). The non-
Aboriginal population tends to reside in towns while the Aboriginal
population is almost evenly divided between the towns and the bush. The
six main Kimberley towns account for 76 per cent of the white population
and 57 per cent of the Aboriginal population. However, the remainder of
the Aboriginal population, and a significant proportion of the youth,
resides in over 250 Aboriginal outstations and communities. It can safely
be assumed that the 24 per cent of the non-Aboriginal population out of the
towns can be found in one or two large settlements such as mines. In the
Aboriginal communities 40 per cent of the population is under the age of
15 years. These communities account for 60 per cent of the Kimberley
Aboriginal population aged 15-24 years, figures which, according to
Dixon's report for the KLC, 'reflect an established trend for an increasing
proportion of Aboriginal youth to be located outside townships, in remote
communities' (KLC 1995: 23), while 'non-Aboriginal people in the 15-19
year age group are, in relative terms, largely absent from Kimberley post-
compulsory education and training, opting for southern institutions or
moving with their families to more established centres of population' (KLC
1995: 13).
Thus, the alternative picture emerging of the Kimberley is of a growing
Aboriginal population occupying the remote areas and an itinerant white
population, with a distorted age and gender structure largely occupying the
towns (see KLC 1995: 22). The Kimberley economy is significantly
dependent on government support for both Aborigines and whites (Crough
and Christophersen 1993). The cattle industry is in decline with poor
prospects (Western Australian Government 1985) and all sectors of the
regional economy contribute only a small proportion of State gross
domestic product (Crough and Christophersen 1993: 44). As Aboriginal
people consolidate their infrastructure for self-management in their
community organisations, they are increasingly arguing that the
demographic and economic profile of the region requires greater regional
autonomy in Aboriginal hands.
Pressure for increased regional autonomy can be dealt with under three
headings: there is the need for change in development funding and service
delivery, but there is also the need to coordinate local and sub-regional
land use agreements which are now being entered into between Aboriginal
groups and developers and government. Finally, there is the more
fundamental need for a change in the political relationship between whites
and Aborigines which recognises the rights of indigenous people to self-
determination in terms of international law and which addresses the
national obligation to find an acceptable form of de-colonisation. The first
of these needs could conceivably be met by a regional authority along the
lines of the TSRA, but to meet the other requirements it would need to
have in its charter the function of negotiating more fundamental change.
The second level of need can be met by coordinating sub-regional
agreements over multiple land use. However, regional coordination on the
Canadian model is the key here if fragmentation and resulting
inconsistency and inefficiency are to be avoided. Regional coordination,
properly instituted, would begin to meet the third need, the requirement for
Aboriginal governance, which is fundamentally political and could begin
to satisfy Australia's domestic and international obligations to social
justice.
A regional authority and control of development funding
Demands for greater Aboriginal autonomy in the Kimberley region began
long before the Mabo decision. The need has been identified at least since
the East Kimberley Impact Assessment Project began in 1984. The mass
meeting of communities at Rugan which produced the Crocodile Hole
Report, provided depth to the call for regional autonomy in 1991 (Coombs
et al. 1989; KLC 1991; Crough and Christophersen 1993: 4-6). Some of
the pressure arises from greater control over land and increasing political
awareness since the establishment of the KLC in 1978. More particularly
the failure by the Western Australian State Government to implement the
recommendations of the Seaman Land Inquiry in 1985 led to greater land
purchases by federal agencies, establishment of a living area program by
the State government, and coincided with a increases in Aboriginal affairs
funding under the Commonwealth Labor government. These developments
have given Kimberley Aboriginal groups a base from which to claim
further rights.
The establishment of ATS1C in 1989 was a step forward for Aboriginal
self-determination. At the community level in the Kimberley today there is
a very strong feeling that it has reached its limits and another step forward
is needed. The ATSIC that was canvassed in the O'Donoghue Report of
1986 and even the ATSIC promised in Gerry Hand's first reading speech in
1987, is very different from the ATSIC actually delivered (O'Donoghue
1986: 41-4; Commonwealth of Australia 1987: 2,3,22). O'Donoghue
carried out extensive consultations with communities and Hand followed
this with his own tour of the country. It is significant, then, that in the
original blueprint for ATSIC, proposed by Hand and initially suggested by
Coombs, representation was not to be drawn from the Aboriginal public at
large but from the existing communities and the community-based service
organisations (O'Donoghue 1986: 19,31; Commonwealth of Australia
1987: 22).
These independent organisations now feel themselves to be disempowered
by the system of directly-elected regional councils that has been provided.
It is not surprising that discontent is most evident in the functional
community organisations that rely on the decisions of Regional
Councillors, Commissioners, and ATSIC functionaries for continued
funding. While making great gains in representativeness, ATSIC has in
other respects carried with it the baggage of the Department of Aboriginal
Affairs (DAA). In particular the remaining centralised decision-making,
the complex procedures for applications for development funds, the
demands from outside the Commission for an accountability beyond the
requirements for other statutory authorities, all cause an inconsistent
delivery of program funds.
The submission of Independent Aboriginal Organisations of the Kimberley
(IAOK) to the Chairman of the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation in
October 1994, titled Towards Regional Autonomy puts their feelings most
forcefully:
Both employees of Aboriginal organisations and communities and ATSIC
regional officers share the same frustration with this onerous and burdensome
funding and accountability process. The whole process is dominated by
excessive paperwork, including funding applications, requests for additional
information, quarterly and annual reporting, audit requirements, reporting under
the Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act, and performance indicator
reporting. The ATSIC administration cannot meet the demands of such a
complex funding allocation system. Serious problems are occurring regularly as
a result, and are regularly identified at Aboriginal meetings as a major source of
frustration.
Communities and organisations are experiencing problems of lost submissions
and late releases forcing illegal deficit funding. Poor advice and inconsistent
funding decisions have created disillusionment with a system that was at first
seen as a positive step towards self determination (IAOK 1994: 7; see also
Crough 1995: 3).
It must be remembered that ATSIC is not simply an amalgamation of the
old DAA and ADC but was also a long awaited replacement for the
National Aboriginal Conference (NAC). Whatever the experience of the
rest of the country, the NAC functioned relatively well in Western
Australia, and in the Kimberley particularly, in providing a political voice.
Moreover, it was an Aboriginal political institution that cooperated very
well with the non-statutory organisations such as the KLC and the various
resource agencies and community organisations which in the Kimberley
exert considerable local influence. The replacement of the NAC with
Regional Councils whose function appeared to be simply to make
recommendations about resource distribution was greeted with great
reservation. The widespread feeling was that here was a structure that did
not reflect local cultural alignments very well, and less so since the
reduction in the number of Regional Councils. It left no room for the
important purpose of representing Aboriginal political demands in the
Western Australian context. It was imposed upon an existing network of
independent, Aboriginal-controlled community service organisations, and
it was at bottom nothing more than a government bureaucracy with an
Aboriginal front line (see IAOK 1994: 1). Calls for greater regional
autonomy in the Kimberley, based on a thorough critique of ATSIC itself,
have been formulated in the need for a more effective structure than
ATSIC presently has. Not surprisingly, this has been rejected both by
ATSIC and by government.
The frustration at the community level has probably been more firmly
stated and more deeply felt precisely because of the greater confidence and
control that ATSIC has promised and to some extent delivered.
Community groups very rapidly took on the promise that ATSIC offered of
greater involvement in their own development, and just as rapidly reached
its limits. The initial reaction from the Minister and some sectors of ATSIC
could be characterised in the old Australian proverb about the farmer
whose 'chooks grew into emus and kicked the dunny over'. This stage of
hurt and anger on the one side, and frustration and disappointment on the
other, is now giving way to a new period where constructive solutions are
sought. Examples of this are the ATSIC contribution on Regional
Agreements to the Social Justice Package (ATSIC 1995: 55-64), a
concerted body of opinion within ATSIC that regionalism furthers self-
determination (see Sanders 1994: 12,22), and the organisation of
conferences between land councils and Regional Councillors on the subject
of regional agreements, such as at Cairns in May 1995.
Aboriginal community groups for their part have often wished to pursue
regional autonomy outside the ATSIC structure. The reaction from
government to any such suggestion has been enough to persuade them that,
for the time being at least, this is not possible. At Yirra near Derby in
October 1994 several regional community organisations held their Annual
General Meetings consecutively over a five-day period which also included
a continuous celebration of Aboriginal law and culture in the performance
of public ceremonies. At the conclusion the visiting Minister for
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs was very firmly told of the
frustration community groups felt with the ATSIC structure and the
possibility that a regional authority may ameliorate their problems with
ATSIC. The reply, reiterated in response to nearly every question, was that
the Minister was powerless, he had devolved all power to ATSIC and was
very proud of this. Unless ATSIC Regional Councils and Commissioners
took on board the question of regional self-government he could not
become involved. Unmentioned, but perhaps more important, the various
strategy and policy sections within ATSIC would also need to be
convinced of the need for reform. Not surprisingly, the reaction appeared
to those observing to be one of amazement and disappointment that the
Minister would so distance himself from a responsible role, and advise
them to seek recourse from the same institution that they were petitioning
him to reform. Robert Watson, a Regional Councillor and Chairman of
Wanang Ngari resource agency in Derby replied to Minister Tickner:
'you've mentioned regional agreements in other parts of the world. We've
got Aboriginal people who are frustrated with a bureaucracy (ATSIC) that
we haven't even set up. You might not have the power to tell ATSIC what
to do, but surely you've got the right to raise discussion, some power for
that. I can't accept you going away and saying what you're saying. As the
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs, surely you've got the ability to raise
discussion and options.' The Minister did not reply to this (KLC Minutes,
Yirra Meeting, October 1994, Derby).
Up against this kind of resistance the IAOK (also known as the Coalition
of Kimberley Aboriginal Organisations or CKAO) met with ATSIC
Regional Councillors in Kununurra in May 1995 and resolved to pursue a
joint approach to the issue, but concrete attempts to implement this
resolution have not so far been successful. Also, a national meeting on
regional agreements organised by ATSIC for all Regional Council Chairs
and Commissioners at Cairns later in May revealed within ATSIC the
concern that moves towards regional self-government may threaten its
existence. The presence of representatives of all major land councils at this
meeting made it difficult to advance the calls for loyalty to the ATSIC
structure exclusively, and in many cases there is cross-membership
between Regional Councils, community service organisations and land
councils. The land councils also were clearly the ones in most control of
developed information or ideas on the issue. It is unfortunately probable
that, until those in the higher reaches of ATSIC realise that ATSIC and the
community organisations are on the same side in this debate, proposals will
continue to be put forward in the suspicion that one side or the other is
trying to take control of the entire process.
A regional authority with the mandate to negotiate a political settlement
may meet some of the pressures for regional autonomy, but will by no
means go all the way to meeting all of them. These are the pressures
identified in the introductory passages of this paper as: the need for
changes in development funding and delivery of development services by
means of a regional authority, the need to coordinate local and sub-regional
land use agreements which are now being entered into between Aboriginal
groups and developers and government, and the more fundamental need for
a change in the political relationship between whites and Aborigines that
recognises Aboriginal rights and concedes a form of de-colonisation that
meets international standards. A regional authority along the lines of the
Torres Strait does not meet all these needs.
This is the only Regional Authority operating in Australia at the moment. It
is worthwhile reproducing Part 28 of the ATSIC Amendment Act (No. 3)
1993 (Part 3A, s.!42A(l) of the ATSIC Act), which establishes the
Authority, at length here, as it sets out what a regional authority actually is.
It reads as follows:
142A. (1) The TSRA has the following functions:
(a) to recognise and maintain the special and unique Ailan Kastom of the Torres
Strait Islanders living in the Torres Strait area;
(b) to formulate and implement programs for Torres Strait Islanders, and Aboriginal
persons, living in the Torres Strait area;
(c) to monitor the effectiveness of programs for Torres Strait Islanders, and
Aboriginal persons, living in the Torres Strait area, including programs
conducted by other bodies;
(d) to develop policy proposals to meet National, State and regional needs and
priorities of Torres Strait Islanders, and Aboriginal persons living in the Torres
Strait area;
(e) to assist, advise and co-operate with Torres Strait Islander and Aboriginal
communities, organisations and individuals at national, State, Territory and
regional levels;
(f) to advise the Minister on:
i. matters relating to Torres Strait Islander affairs, and Aboriginal affairs,
in the Torres Strait area, including the administration of legislation;
ii. the co-ordination of the activities of other Commonwealth bodies that
affect Torres Strait Islanders, or Aboriginal persons, living in the Torres
Strait area;
(g) when requested by the Minister, to provide information or advice to the Minister
on any matter specified by the Minister;
(h) to take such reasonable action as it considers necessary to protect Torres Strait
Islander and Aboriginal cultural material and information relating to the Torres
Strait area if the material or information is considered sacred or otherwise
significant by Torres Strait Islanders or Aboriginal persons;
(i) at the request of, or with the agreement of, the Australian Bureau of Statistics
but not otherwise, to collect and publish statistical information relating to Torres
Strait Islanders, and Aboriginalpersons, living in the Torres Strait area;
(]) such other functions as are conferred on the TSRA by this Act or any other Act;
(k) such other functions as are expressly conferred on the TSRA by a law of a State
or of an internal Territory and in respect of which there is in force written
approval by the Minister under section 142B;
(1) to undertake such research as is necessary to enable the TSRA to perform any of
its other functions;
(m) to do anything else that is incidental or conducive to the performance of any of
the preceding functions.
There follow sections detailing the Ministers power to require information,
under paragraph (g) and the limits on its disclosure by the TSRA, and the
express provision that the TSRA is not to acquire land.
Clearly this is an advisory and coordinating body with responsibility for
planning and distributing program funding but no wider influence (except
as may be conferred on it by Queensland legislation with the consent of the
Minister). There is no doubt that in negotiating this agreement Torres Strait
Island leaders also intended it to be a first step towards self-government
but they may now be finding that it has closed the door on further
developments for the near future (Sanders 1994: 14,16, and pers. comm.).
Regional and sub-regional agreements over land use
A regional agreement between various levels of government and an
indigenous people who hold native title, as distinct from a regional
authority to distribute development funds, arises out of the need for
effective land management. It goes beyond this in many cases, however,
since the regulation of multiple access to, use, benefit and protection of,
Aboriginal land can require not simply a change of administration but of
governance. This is clear when the aims of indigenous people in Canadian
Regional Agreements are examined:
According to Richardson et al. the core objectives of indigenous people in
Canadian Regional Agreements have been to:
i. define a new legal and political relationship between themselves and
Canadian governments (the Federal government and the relevant
Provincial and Territory governments);
ii. establish a clear framework concerning access to and use of land and
resources that accommodates the needs of indigenous peoples and other
interests;
iii. preserve and enhance the cultural and social wellbeing of indigenous
societies;
iv. enable indigenous societies to develop self-governing institutions and an
economic base which will assist them to participate effectively in
decisions which affect their interests (Richardson et al. 1995: 2).
These, then, are. political relationships entered into between distinct
peoples which govern the ownership and use of land and resources.
Australia has no tradition of dealing with its indigenous population as a
distinct people or peoples, nor of recognising until very recently inherent
indigenous rights to land (as opposed to land grants made on the basis of
traditional association as under the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern
Territory) Act 1976. On the contrary, Australia has always dealt with
indigenous issues as an administrative problem to be managed and
controlled by effective administrative structures. A very pertinent example
is the government's response to the Mabo decision. It did not choose the
path of entering into a reconciliatory agreement over the principles of
accommodation between two peoples, but moved immediately to translate
the decision into a regulatory set of laws and programs for its containment
within the existing framework of the Australian polity.
Aboriginal leaders can not help but be struck by the way that developments
such as the establishment of ATSIC, the results of the Royal Commission
into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody, and the NTA, to name only three
examples, have been reduced from their original aim of recognising
Aboriginal rights to the more manageable project of containing and
administering the 'Aboriginal problem'. They will probably, then, be wary
of entering into negotiations over further administrative structures without
a good deal of careful scrutiny.
Nevertheless, the pressure for some form of greater regional autonomy is
intense. It is being driven, as I have said by frustration at the community
level, but also by the need to carry out agreements over joint land use at the
local and sub-regional levels with or without an appropriate regional
structure. There is the need to co-ordinate activity both for the productive
use of land and for its conservation over large tracts of land. Large areas of
land are already in Aboriginal hands as pastoral lease or Aboriginal reserve
and they cover a number of different Aboriginal cultural groupings.
Effective land management cannot take place at the regional and sub-
regional level without involving Aboriginal land holders in strategic plans,
consultations, negotiations, and finally binding agreements.
Multiple land use agreements are needed between white development
interests and Aboriginal land holders and between and among Aboriginal
groups themselves. Aborigines now hold 25 of the 98 pastoral leases in the
Kimberley, and two more are in the final stages of purchase. Current
holdings (not including the two stations under negotiation at the time of
writing) amount to 5,136,711 hectares. They also have some control over
about 5,032,128 hectares of Aboriginal Reserve land which is held by the
State government's Aboriginal Lands Trust (ALT). This gives them control
over 24 per cent of Kimberley land, which could rise substantially if future
native title claims over conservation reserve, national park and vacant
Crown land (VCL) are successfully mounted (Crough and Christophersen
1993: 53; Western Australian Department of Land (personal inquiry);
Aboriginal Affairs Planning Authority 1994: 55-6, 60-2). Aborigines now
own about 23 per cent of all pastoral land in the Kimberley and more
purchases can be expected. The establishment of the Indigenous Land
Corporation (or ILC) on 1 July 1995 could increase Aboriginal land
holdings in the Kimberley in the next few years, and can be expected to
pay attention to regional land management strategies.
Green and Hawke point out that '... it is generally true that Aboriginal
properties are at the 'poor' end of the market, handicapped by one or more
of the factors of size, quality of country, remoteness and difficult terrain. In
many cases these are the reasons why they have been available for
acquisition' (Green and Hawke 1994: 9). During the period of their study
Aborigines owned 23 per cent of pastoral land but could account for only 9
per cent of total cattle numbers in the industry and only 5 per cent of turn
off (Green and Hawke 1994: 10). They provide a number of reasons for
this including low stock numbers at purchase and poor quality of land. A
map of Kimberley pastoral stations and Aboriginal reserves superimposed
on a satellite-based map of productive grassland would show four
immediate matters to be taken into account:
Aborigines control the poorest land.
Aborigines, if regarded as a corporate group, constitute the largest
single landholder in the Kimberley.
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iii. Many Aboriginal pastoral holdings and Reserves are contiguous or
in close proximity to each other.
iv. Productive pastoral land bears no relationship to pastoral station or
reserve boundaries (see Dillon 1986).
Both Aborigines and whites are demanding more uses of land than its
reservation for a single category of enterprise can permit (Young and Ross
1994). Given the four most obvious characteristics above both sides have
an interest in maximising productive use of land and working
cooperatively for multiple use based on alternative land values.
Some alternative land values may be:
i. Aboriginal living areas.
ii. Aboriginal cultural and economic values shown in burning, moving
over and inhabiting the land and expressed in such terms as 'looking
after country',
iii. Aboriginal hunting, fishing and camping for cultural and economic
reasons.
iv. Preservation of sacred areas,
v. Conservation.
vi. Quarantine. Feral animal and noxious weed control,
vii. Non-aboriginal recreational and tourist access,
viii. Mineral exploration and mining,
ix. Alternatives to conventional pastoralism such as emu, camel, and
crocodile farming.
With a range of other interests targeting their land for alternative uses, and
taking into account its marginal productivity, Aboriginal land holders will
increasingly have to enter into complex agreements both with outside
interests and among themselves.
Firstly, there is the economic pressure to identify productive land and enter
into agreement with neighbouring Aboriginal land holders to jointly
operate an enterprise. The corollary of this is to take out of the attempt at
production, land that is too degraded by over use, or land that will never
provide a return. One area in the south Kimberley is an obvious place to
attempt to negotiate such agreements. Here it is possible to journey for
about two hundred kilometres in a northerly direction from the boundary of
Lake Gregory station, then about two hundred kilometres in a north-
westerly direction, to traverse seven pastoral stations, and not once to leave
Aboriginal land. This great expanse is separated by only one other property
on its western extent and one on its north western from two other large
Aboriginal land holdings. Increasingly these gaps are being filled across
the Kimberley, yet no large-scale attempt has been made to co-ordinate
production across separately owned properties.
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Forging agreements between these Aboriginal groups for the benefits of
economies of scale from linking up productive areas is by no means easily
done. Even harder is to bring together these disparate groups to take a
common approach to outside interests in the land. These also do not
confine themselves to station boundaries. Agreements with conservation
bodies such as the Australian Nature Conservation Agency to take land out
of production and cull feral animals, or agreements over mineral
exploration or tourist access, will require coordination of the Aboriginal
response across a locality or sub-region since the targetted areas must take
into account land types, and not simply leaseholdings or other forms of
title.
Yet in the example above the contiguous stations cover the territory of four
language groups that have little in common with each other, and numerous
other cultural and land-oriented sub-groupings such as historical station
communities, dialectical areas, ceremonial affiliations, and clan groups.
Disagreements among Aboriginal people over joint use and benefit of the
land have often stood in the way of the purchase of stations and currently
cause considerable disruption on a number of them. Attempts at
cooperation across station boundaries can be expected at an early stage to
fall foul of the lack of a common voice and lack of agreement over the
legitimacy of any one group to negotiate.
The questions raised here, of which only the superficialities have been
addressed, all call for regional and sub-regional coordination. There is the
need for the initial investigation of a sub-region's potential as well as its
social and cultural dynamics. Following this is the need for strategic plans
to address the range of land values. Further still, agreements between
developers, governments and Aboriginal interests need to be negotiated in
a realistic and sustainable way by appropriate representatives. Moves in
this direction can be expected with the establishment of a regional
subsidiary of the ILC and by the extension of the Kimberley Land Councils
Kimberley Aboriginal Pastoralists project (Green and Hawke 1994: 82-98).
Negotiations will need to take place with the entire range of Aboriginal
interest groups, not simply with those that currently hold leasehold title to a
pastoral station or reserve. Conceptions of Aboriginal land ownership and
religious ties to the land do not always, perhaps rarely, overlap with current
corporate forms of land ownership to any great extent. These forms of
traditional attachment are too easily forgotten when hard-headed economic
negotiations are taking place, but they will reappear when moves are made
to convert reserves and pastoral stations to native title under the NTA.
They should be addressed in any case. There has been a tendency for
Aboriginal pastoralists and their funding agency, ATSIC, to embrace too
wholeheartedly the current orthodoxy that Aboriginal alternative land
values and commercially efficient enterprises do not mix. They believe the
harmful results of having an Aboriginal community on the land, as distinct
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from the stock operation itself, needs to be contained and regulated, and in
many cases opposed. There is also a continuing tendency for funding
agencies to believe that it is more efficient to administer and deliver
services to Aborigines in large communities. This discourages more
widespread use of reserve land. Increasingly, then, there is a division
emerging among Aboriginal groups themselves between those that control
land and those that want access to it.
These orthodoxies need to be challenged. Elementary observation indicates
that small communities widely scattered, well-serviced, particularly with
communications, and in easy reach of a resource centre, are probably a
more effective use of the development dollar. Quantitative investigations
should be carried out. If this more congenial use of the land is seen to be
incompatible with other uses such incompatibilities need to be identified
and strategies produced for overcoming them. For example, on pastoral
stations efficient use of fencing can keep stock from river banks and yet
allow human access. This can control the severe erosion apparent
everywhere that stock has unrestricted access, and allow people with local
knowledge a productive role in monitoring environmental damage, noxious
weed control, and income supplementation from fishing and hunting. There
are also the benefits in greater wellbeing from satisfying social and cultural
needs. The expense involved is in the need to pipe water for stock to tanks,
to create flood-water dams, put down bores, or to concentrate stock more
heavily with the introduction of new food crops and drought resistant cattle
breeds.
Aboriginal groups should be expected to be in the forefront of new
methods so that both human needs and the demands of the cattle industry
can be satisfied. It will take regional and sub-regional coordination by
those who are sensitive to all the dynamics involved. On the one hand
some pressure should be applied by those who have funded the purchase
and management of land so that benefits are more widely spread.
Amalgamating areas of productive land is important in maximising
economic return. Just as important is requiring multiple access by
dispossessed groups to take the pressure off overcrowded communities
with their problems of ill-health, alcoholism, vandalism, over-use of
housing resources, and community tensions. These too have an economic
dimension that needs to be brought into the discussion. These are present
needs arising out of the contemporary profile of land holding and
Aboriginal residence patterns.
The discussion so far has identified the need for multiple land use
agreements among Aborigines and between themselves and outside
interests at the local and sub-regional levels. It also suggests that the
problems of formulating agreements are not only technical but social and
cultural and for this reason, if for no others, require Aboriginal regional
planning, regulation, and administration. It would be more efficient and
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ultimately sustainable if the principles of multiple land use could be
established by means of a regional agreement between the three levels of
government and Aboriginal interests. Such an agreement would also
determine the level of administration and control of land use planning in
Aboriginal hands, and an agreement could be negotiated under die terms of
s.21(l)(b) of the Native Title Act 1993. So far in this discussion little
attention has been paid to the impact of the Native Title legislation on the
changes already under way in the relationship between Aboriginal and
non-Aboriginal people in the Kimberley. The impact of the mediation
provisions of the National Native Title Tribunal may be profound.
The need for negotiated agreements over land use will increase with the
operation of the NTA, but not in the way originally envisaged. Relatively
few practitioners are yet involved in current claims processes in Australia,
but among those who are there is an increasing body of opinion that the
NTA does not in fact truly recognise the principles of the Mabo decision.
An Act that should be simply for the purpose of registering pre-existing
title is in practice one where a great burden of proof is put on the
titleholders to demonstrate that title exists and that it confers substantial
rights. If this is achieved the Act then steps in to limit those rights for the
sake of stability and continuity. The initial enthusiastic expectation that the
Mabo decision would result in large amounts of land in the Kimberley
passing into the unencumbered control of the indigenous owners now
needs to be altered.
The procedure for establishing and registering Native Title is long and
difficult and the rules are currently uncertain. Predictions about the
outcome must take into account the possibility that no land will be
successfully registered in the near future. More certainly, the gaining of
partial rights will occur and shares in the benefit and use of the land will be
negotiated with broader Australian interest groups. To some extent this is
now emerging out of the Tribunal process, where considerable pressure is
felt by the claimants to conclude negotiated settlements rather than risk all
in the Federal Court (Sullivan 1995). Even those cases that do go to the
Federal Court may result in the decision that some rights have been
extinguished, even over Aboriginal reserves and conservation reserves, and
that the remaining rights are not to be enjoyed exclusively but jointly with
government and development interests.
There are several reasons for the disappointing application of the NTA in
the Kimberley region:
L There is little VCL in the Kimberley where Aboriginal title can most
easily be proved to have survived. Much of it has reverted from pastoral
leasehold that was abandoned or never taken up, and arguments that title
has not been extinguished by the issuing of these leases will be difficult
and time consuming to mount. VCL is in that category largely because it
was of no use to whites. Since they settled elsewhere and Aborigines
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settled with them there are problems of proof of continuity of occupation
and continuation of a cultural system. Where this can be overcome there
is no certainty Aborigines in all cases wish to return to this land. The
economic benefits from regaining it will, due to the nature of the land,
largely be limited to mineral exploitation, a benefit the Act explicitly tells
them they have the right to negotiate over but not to refuse. The exception
to this may be in some towns, such as Broome, where small pockets of
VCL remain that have commercial value and bring the native titleholders
into direct negotiation with others who have a need for the land.
ii. The continuation of native title may prove to be compatible with
conservation reserves. This will serve to put the titleholders in a much
stronger position to negotiate joint benefits than they presently have, but
will probably not confer on them anything approaching full beneficial
ownership.
iii. At present native title to Aboriginal reserve land must be claimed in the
same way as any other category. If successful it may remove the reserve
from the control of the State government's ALT, a statutory authority that
holds all Aboriginal reserve land in the State. A permit is required from
the ALT to enter an Aboriginal reserve. Permission is also needed from
the ALT before mining can proceed. These provisions have been used to
negotiate benefits from exploration and mining and would be removed
under native title. However, on one reserve considerable advances have
been made in negotiation with large-scale diamond exploration interests
under the threat of a current native title claim. It is not yet certain that the
right to negotiate provisions of the NTA, lacking the power to forbid
access, will provide stronger protection than current paternalist
arrangements.
iv. Converting Aboriginal pastoral leases to native title will bring the lease
under the right to negotiate provisions of the NTA. It may also precipitate
the kind of intra-Aboriginal access and living area agreements called for
above. Since title would survive, whether the lease is cancelled or varied,
it may lead to re-negotiation of pastoral station boundaries to put the
industry on a more rational footing.
v. Access to non-Aboriginal pastoral leases continues to be denied on many
Kimberley stations. Negotiations over a code of conduct for Aboriginal
access have been stalled for some time, although there is growing interest
among some more forward thinking pastoralists to revive the dialogue
initiated by the KLC before the NTA came down. The NTA leaves the
question open whether all aspects of title have been extinguished on land
leased before 1975. The Mabo judges were divided. The Waanyi people's
application for registration of native title over pastoral land was rejected
but this is to be challenged (French 1995: 3-4). In any case a regional
approach to agreement over use of Aboriginal land must include
negotiation with the State government for Aboriginal access to land where
title has been extinguished or will be difficult to establish.
For all of these reasons, regional coordination of a land use and
management strategy is required for rational and sustainable development.
The establishment of organisations that embody native titleholders and
allow them to enjoy rights and negotiate terms with others is a priority and
is already pushing the formulation of sub-regional and local agreements.
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The very real problem at the moment is that this is being carried out
without effective regional coordination.
This leads to the third level of pressure for a regional settlement that was
introduced earlier in the discussion. This is the need for devolution of
authority to Aboriginal representative organisations. Agreements at the
local level that bear some of the characteristics of Canadian regional
agreements for control over land will be struck, indeed are now being
struck, without any formal regional negotiating system or overall plan in
place. There is a danger that self-determination in the Kimberley will be
undermined by these single purpose agreements at the local level lacking
regional coordination. They may consist only of the conceding of rights for
some form of conventional benefit devoid of real control. Side by side with
this a regional authority could be limited to simply administering federal
grant money, again without any formal ability to intervene in the social and
political life of the region or the State. For these reasons, as previously
suggested, any further consideration of a regional body for the devolution
of funding decisions must also explicitly recognise such a body as
transitional. It should be given the responsibility also to coordinate
consultations and negotiations towards the kind of political realignment
between sovereign peoples such as that called for in the ATS1C submission
on Native Title Social Justice Measures (ATSIC 1995: 55-64).
From regional authority to Aboriginal governance
This discussion has so far pointed out the pressures present for some form
of regional coordination of land use and a structure for Aboriginal political
expression in the Kimberley. It is important now to begin discussing
possible models, even though they may bear little relation to what is
eventually achieved. This will focus the debate not only on what is
required but the problems involved in the various means of achieving it.
Two questions need to be addressed. The first is what level of government
is being considered? As French points out, the Mabo judgment starts from
the proposition that Crown sovereignty is legitimate (since this sovereignty
establishes the High Court it could hardly be otherwise) the question of
sovereignty is therefore non-justiciable under domestic law (French 1995:
1). Nor is there the means to litigate outside the country, there is no court
to try the proposition that Australian sovereignty has been illegally
established and determine the consequences that could flow from such a
finding. This does not mean, however, that there is no international law to
cover the matter, there is a substantial amount. It has been plain to
Aboriginal interests since the Mabo judgment, that recognising Australia
was not legally terra nullius on conquest, calls into question the basis of
the political relationship between the colonisers and the colonised. That the
dispute cannot be litigated does not mean that the Aboriginal case has no
substance. Nor does it mean that there is no international (or domestic)
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recourse for Aboriginal people. Potential avenues of complaint range from
seeking international support of the sort that Australia itself offered the
independence movement in South Africa, to formal complaints at the
United Nations in human rights forums and under international instruments
to which Australia is, or has pledged to become, a signatory.
These avenues have been cultivated by Aboriginal interests for some time
before the Mabo decision. So the assumption that the non-justiciable
implications of the Mabo decision are dead issues is premature. They are
alive in the minds of the Aboriginal leadership and will rise to haunt the
Australian polity until a just settlement is made. Nevertheless, proposals
for sovereign statehood will obviously remain beyond the realm of the
achievable for the foreseeable future. On the other hand, modifications to
the system of local government, which will be proposed below, are likely
to satisfy a range of interests both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal without
straining credulity in the proposition.
The second question, which is now arising in the Torres Strait, ought to
come to the forefront of thinking on regional governance (Sanders 1994).
Is the goal Aboriginal self-government of Aboriginal people in Aboriginal
areas, or is it Aboriginal dominated government of the entire region? The
first approach is the most easy to attain, indeed a number of mechanisms to
achieve some measure of this already exist (see Sullivan 1994). The
establishment of a regional authority under the ATSIC Act would cement
such an approach, perhaps irretrievably. The danger is that it will
segregate, perhaps ghettoise, Aboriginal culture while allowing the more
powerful European-based interests to take advantage of all mainstream
opportunities. A more satisfactory approach would be to aim for a unified
regional government with a fair electoral system reflecting Aboriginal
control of the non-town areas as well as their considerable urban interests,
and functionally linked to Aboriginal organisations and statutory
authorities (such as the ILC). Again if the level of government aimed at is
something on the model of local government, the proposal for Aboriginal
regional governance, rather than Aboriginal self-government, is not too
alarming to all concerned.
In outline such a proposal would see the present four shires in the
Kimberley come together in a regional assembly that would also coincide
with the ATSIC zone. The present shires would need to be divided into
wards, where these do not already exist (for instance on the Dampier Land
Peninsula) and the wards would need to directly elect representatives in
much the same way as electoral divisions do in the State as a whole. This
would have the effect of reducing the influence of the town vote and
producing a fairer representation of country areas, again as it does in the
State as whole, although in this case these areas happen to be largely
Aboriginal. The Regional Councils would continue to exist. They could
themselves be divided into the same wards, with Shire and Regional
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Council boundaries amended slightly so that they are the same. The
Aboriginal administration would exist inside the broader Aboriginal and
non-Aboriginal combined government. For purely Aboriginal business,
such as the distribution of program funding, they would meet as Aboriginal
Regional Councils under a regional authority. For more general purposes
the same individuals would meet with the elected representatives of the
whole community as a regional forum of local government.
Broad suggestions are made about the level of regional government, how it
may fit with existing forms of Aboriginal administration and local
government, and the electoral process. There remains one important
improvement to suggest. The elected arm of regional government needs to
be integrated with functional bodies at the community level, both
community or language grouping councils and community service
organisations. At the regional level integration must be achieved with other
statutory authorities, both Aboriginal such as the ILC, and non-Aboriginal
such as the Kimberley Development Commission. This is necessary for
effective regional land management.
These broad suggestions are made to foster debate and open up the
discussion of practical steps to meet the needs of the emerging Kimberley
cultural, social, and economic profile. These and any similar proposals will
require amendments to current legislation and intricate negotiation of
interests with Federal, State, and local government. Much of this must
centre on funding questions of the kind recently canvassed in some depth
by Crough (1995). Under present circumstances such suggestions may
seem radical and likely to encounter the intractable opposition of existing
non-Aboriginal interests, in particular the Shires and the State government.
The intent of this paper has been to suggest that events may be carrying
Kimberley people in this direction in any case. Increasingly, needs for
multiple access to land in which Aborigines can now assert recognised
rights will bring such suggestions from the realm of mere aspiration to the
cold light of the negotiating table.
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